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1 Introduction
At least since Modigliani and Miller (1958), how firms choose their capital structure
has attracted much attention and there is a large empirical and theoretical literature
that explores these issues (e.g. Myers (1977), Myers and Majluf (1984), Denis and
Mihov (2003), Becker and Ivashina (2014)). Relative to other forms of financing such
as equity and bank loans, corporate debt is an important source of funding for US
corporations (Denis and Mihov (2003)) and the corporate bond market has grown
rapidly over the last decade (Office of Financial Research (2015)).
In this paper, we study the effect of corporate yields on bond issuance of US firms.
In contrast to earlier studies (e.g. Frank and Goyal (2008)), we adopt an incremental
approach that investigates the conditional probability of issuing a corporate bond
which is particularly suitable for questions related to time-variation in the regressors.
While previous work has documented that issuer characteristics like size, rating,
profitability, leverage, equity prices, monetary policy, information asymmetry and
the supply of bank credit are important determinants of bond issuance (e.g. Mizen
and Tsoukas (2013), Badoer and James (2016), Adrian et al. (2012), Denis and Mihov
(2003), Becker and Ivashina (2014), Gomes and Phillips (2012)), there is not much
evidence yet on the effect of yields on bond issuance.
Answering the question of how funding costs in corporate bond markets affect
issuance decisions sheds light on a particular transmission mechanism of monetary
policy: by means of conventional and unconventional monetary policy tools, the
central bank can affect the interest rates firms face in corporate bond markets. Bond
issuance, on the other hand, tends to be related to corporate investment and thus
aggregate demand (Farrant et al. (2013)).
We study the effect of yields on bond issuance using a novel dataset that includes
bond issuances by US firms between 1990 and 2015 on a monthly frequency. During
that period, we observe 5610 issuances with an average size of approximately 300
million USD made by 1004 different firms. We find that for non-financial firms,
yields are negatively related to bond issuance but that effect is larger in the pre-crisis
period. In contrast, there is no significant effect of yields on corporate bond issuance
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for financial firms. Splitting the data by the credit rating of the issuer reveals that
the negative relationship between yields and corporate bond issuance is driven by
firms with a low credit rating. These results are robust to applying different sample
selection criteria, to including additional regressors and to using corporate spreads
instead of yields as the primary regressor.
To identify the parameters of interest, it is important to control for unobserved,
common shocks that are frequently encountered in these type of datasets. In our em-
pirical application, the unobserved factors can represent a new regulatory landscape,
changes in investor behavior such as search for yield, automated trading or policies
that aim at deepening corporate bond markets, for example. Andrews (2005) shows
that common shocks create problems for inference if data are available for a single
cross-sectional unit and the model is estimated by least squares or instrumental vari-
able methods. But the increased availability of panel data where both the time series
and cross-sectional dimensions are large offers new opportunities for controlling for
these unobserved shocks. Bai (2009) and Pesaran (2006) are examples for panel data
estimators robust to common shocks.
This paper contributes to this literature by developing an estimator for large
heterogeneous panels with cross-sectional dependence in a framework where outcomes
are discrete. The proposed estimator belongs to the class of common correlated
effects (CCE) estimators that approximate the unobserved factors with cross-sectional
averages of both the regressors and the response variable (Pesaran (2006)). But this
approach is complicated in nonlinear models where it is difficult to use averages of
response variables without making strong assumptions. This paper adopts the CCE
estimation methodology to discrete choice models under the assumption that the
unobserved factors are contained in the span of the observed factors and the cross-
sectional averages of the regressors.
We present large sample distribution theory for our estimation procedures for
the setting where both the time dimension T and the cross-sectional dimension N
are large. We first show that the estimator of the individual-specific coefficients is
consistent and asymptotically normal. An important part of the asymptotic theory is
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uniform consistency of the preliminary estimator, which we establish under moment
conditions. Based on the asymptotic properties of the estimators of the individual-
specific coefficients, we derive the consistency and asymptotic normality for the mean
group estimator that is defined as the average of the individual-specific estimators.
Inference regarding the mean group effect follows straightforwardly: we show that the
asymptotic variance of the mean group estimator can be estimated by the covariance
matrix of the individual-specific coefficient estimates. This covariance estimator is
similar to the estimator obtained in linear regression models (Pesaran (2006)).
By means of a simulation study, we document that for a wide range of factor
structures, the mean group estimator is comparable in terms of RMSE and bias to
an infeasible estimator that counterfactually assumes that the common factors are
known. In addition, the mean group estimator has good empirical power, size and
coverage probabilities.
Our paper is related to Fernandez-Val and Weidner (2016) and Chen et al. (2014)
who propose alternative estimators for large, nonlinear panels with fixed effects.
Fernandez-Val and Weidner (2016) study nonlinear panel data models with additive
fixed effects. They characterize the bias that arises due to the incidental parameter
problem (Neyman and Scott (1948)) and provide analytical and jackknife corrections
to remove this bias. In contrast to this paper, they assume that the slope coefficients
are homogeneous and that the fixed effects enter additively. Chen et al. (2014) is
probably the paper closest to ours. They also propose an estimator for nonlinear
panel data models with interactive fixed effects. But while the contribution we make
is along the lines of simplicity and applicability and indeed the application, their fo-
cus is on developing a comprehensive asymptotic theory for a wide range of nonlinear
panel data models. In contrast, we are only concerned with binary choice models
which are popular among applied economists. One advantage of our approach is
that our estimator can be computed by simply averaging regression coefficients from
Probit models estimated for each individual unit. In contrast, Chen et al. (2014)’s es-
timator is computed iteratively in a two-step procedure which makes it more difficult
to implement in practice.
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Our paper is also related to the literature on common correlated effects estimation.
That literature was pioneered by Pesaran (2006) who first proposed to approximate
the unobserved factors by cross-sectional averages. Since then, a growing literature
has extended the CCE approach in various ways: Pesaran and Tosetti (2011) combine
the factor approach with spatial models by assuming that the disturbances net of the
common factors follow a spatial process, see also Chudik et al. (2011). Kapetanios
et al. (2011) show that the CCE estimator is consistent even if the unobserved factors
are non-stationary. Chudik and Pesaran (2015) extend the CCE estimator to dynamic
panels. Baltagi et al. (2015) develop a CCE estimator for data with structural breaks.
Harding and Lamarche (2014) propose a quantile CCE estimator for homogeneous
panel data with endogenous regressors, and Boneva et al. (2016) develop a quantile
CCE estimator for heterogeneous panels. The contribution of this paper is to extend
the CCE approach to discrete outcomes.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The econometric model is
presented in Section 2 and Section 3 describes the estimation methodology and dis-
cusses related estimators for nonlinear panel data. Section 4 develops the asymptotic
theory. Section 5 reports the results of a simulation study and Section 6 applies
our estimator to investigate how yields affect the decision to issue a corporate bond.
Section 7 concludes.
2 Econometric model
This section describes the econometric framework. We observe a sample of panel
data {(Yit, Xit, dt) : i = 1, . . . , N, t = 1, . . . , T}, where i denotes the i-th unit and t
is the time point of observation. To keep the notation simple, we assume that the
panel is balanced. The data are assumed to come from the model
Y ∗it = α
ᵀ
i dt + β
ᵀ
iXit + eit, i = 1, . . . , N, t = 1, . . . , T, (1)
where Xit is a Kx × 1 vector of individual-specific regressors that are assumed to
be strictly exogenous and stationary and dt is a Kd × 1 vector of observed common
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factors that do not vary across individual units. Here, Y ∗it is a latent variable that is
related to the observed response variable Yit via the indicator function I(.),
Yit = I(Y
∗
it ). (2)
That is, Yit is unity if Y
∗
it > 0 and zero otherwise. This paper is concerned with
inference for the heterogeneous coefficients βi and their mean. This is complicated
by cross-sectional dependence which is modeled by assuming that the disturbances
exhibit the factor structure
eit = κ
ᵀ
i ft + it, (3)
where ft is a Kf ×1 vector of unobserved common factors and κi is a Kf ×1 vector of
factor loadings. The disturbances it are i.i.d. conditional on the factors and have a
known symmetric density φ and distribution function Φ (perhaps but not necessarily
the normal distribution with zero mean and unit variance). We may write
Pr(Yit = 1|Xit, dt, ft) = 1−Φ(−αᵀi dt − β
ᵀ
iXit − κ
ᵀ
i ft) = Φ(α
ᵀ
i dt + β
ᵀ
iXit + κ
ᵀ
i ft). (4)
In many panel data applications, the unobserved common factors ft are correlated
with both the response variable and the regressors, introducing a certain type of en-
dogeneity. To allow for this possibility, the individual-specific regressors are assumed
to follow the model
Xit = A
ᵀ
i dt +K
ᵀ
i ft + uit, (5)
where Ai is a coefficient matrix of dimension Kd ×Kx, and Ki is a Kf ×Kx matrix
of factor loadings and uit have a zero mean and are i.i.d. conditional on the common
factors.
We make the following assumptions, which are maintained throughout the paper:
(A1) Random coefficient model : the coefficients ϑi = (α
ᵀ
i , β
ᵀ
i , κ
ᵀ
i , vec(Ai)
ᵀ
, vec(Ki)
ᵀ
)
ᵀ
are generated by
ϑi = ϑ0 + ηi, (6)
where ηi ∼i.i.d.(0,Σ) and is distributed independently of κj, Kj, jt, ujt, dt, ft
for all i, j, t, ‖β‖ ≤ C <∞.
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(A2) Common factors : the (Kf + Kd) × 1 vector of common factors gt = (f ᵀt , dᵀt )ᵀ
is assumed to be bounded and covariance stationary with absolute summable
covariances, and distributed independently of the disturbances it and uis, for
all i, t, s.
(A3) Factor loadings : the factor loadings κi and Ki are i.i.d. across i, and distributed
independently of the disturbances jt and ujt and the common factors ft and
dt, for all i, j, t with finite means and variances.
(A4) The function Φ is three times differentiable.
3 Estimation
3.1 A common correlated effects estimator for discrete choice
panels
The econometric model (1)-(5) depends on the unobserved factors ft which makes
estimation difficult. One approach to control for unobserved factors is to approx-
imate them by cross-sectional averages of the regressors and the response variable
(Pesaran (2006)). But in nonlinear panel data models, it is difficult to use averages
of response variables without making strong assumptions. Instead, we approximate
the unobserved factors by cross-sectional averages of the regressors. This approach
is valid if the unobserved factors are contained in the span of the observed factors
and the cross-sectional averages of the regressors. This assumption is more restrictive
compared to the linear set-up in Pesaran (2006) where also the dependent variable
can be used to approximate the unobserved factors.1
Let h0t = A0
ᵀ
dt + K0
ᵀ
ft and ht = A
ᵀ
dt + K
ᵀ
ft be vectors in RKx , where we use
A0 and K0 to denote the population means of Ai and Ki and A = N
−1∑N
i=1Ai and
K = N−1
∑N
i=1Ki to denote their sample counterparts. These quantities will be used
to rewrite the likelihood function. Then, under the assumption that for large N the
Kf ×Kx matrix K is of full rank:
rank(K) = Kf ≤ Kx, (7)
1In case of microeconometric panels where individual-specific unobserved characteristics like abil-
ity are likely to be correlated with the regressors, the indices t and i can be interchanged and
time-series averages can be used to approximate the unobserved loadings.
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we have ft = (K K
ᵀ
)−1K ht − (KKᵀ)−1KA
ᵀ
dt. We also have for all t, N
Pr(Yit = 1|dt, Xit, ft) = Pr(Yit = 1|dt, Xit, ht) = Φ(αᵀi dt + β
ᵀ
iXit + κ
ᵀ
iht), (8)
where αi = αi + K˜
ᵀ
κi and κi = K˜
ᵀ
κi with K˜ = (K K
ᵀ
)−1K . The true individual-
specific coefficients and their population means are denoted by θ0i = (α¯
ᵀ
0i, β
ᵀ
0i, κ¯
ᵀ
0i)
ᵀ
,
θ0 = (α¯
ᵀ
0, β
ᵀ
0 , κ¯
ᵀ
0)
ᵀ ∈ RKd+2Kx .
Letting p denote the generic conditional distribution, we may define the infeasible
objective function
QiT (θ) =
1
T
T∑
t=1
qit(θ, ht) (9)
= − 1
T
T∑
t=1
log p(Yit|dt, Xit, ht, θ), (10)
= − 1
T
T∑
t=1
[Yit log Φ(θ
ᵀ
zit) + (1− Yit) log(1− Φ(θᵀzit))],
where zit = (d
ᵀ
t , X
ᵀ
it, h
ᵀ
t )
ᵀ
and θ ∈ RKd+2Kx ; this requires knowledge of ht. Let θ˜i =
(˜¯αᵀi , β˜ᵀi , ˜¯κᵀi )ᵀ ∈ RKd+2Kx be defined as the (infeasible) minimizer of QiT (θ) with respect
to θ ∈ Θ. The quantity ht is no more observable than ft, but it has a direct analogue
or approximator, X t = N
−1∑N
i=1 Xit. Define the Kx × 1 vector ĥt ≡ X t = A
ᵀ
dt +
K
ᵀ
ft+ut, where we switch notation to emphasize the connection with ht and h0t and
to understand ht as a large dimensional nuisance parameter that is replaced by the
sample quantity ĥt. Then define the feasible objective function
Q̂iT (θ) =
1
T
T∑
t=1
qit(θ, ĥt)
= − 1
T
T∑
t=1
log p(Yit|dt, Xit, ĥt, θ) (11)
= − 1
T
T∑
t=1
[Yit log Φ(θ
ᵀ
ẑit) + (1− Yit) log(1− Φ(θᵀ ẑit))],
where ẑit = zit = (d
ᵀ
t , X
ᵀ
it, ĥ
ᵀ
t )
ᵀ
. The estimator θ̂i = (̂¯αᵀi , β̂ᵀi , ̂¯κᵀi )ᵀ ∈ RKd+2Kx is defined
as the minimizer of Q̂iT (θ) with respect to θ ∈ Θ. In practice, standard numerical al-
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gorithms can be used to find the optimum, since after substituting for ĥt this amounts
to estimation of a parametric binary choice model with a known link function.
The mean group estimator is defined as
θ̂ =
1
N
N∑
i=1
θ̂i. (12)
We will have special interest in the subvector β̂. Define also the infeasible mean group
estimator θ˜ =
N∑
i=1
θ˜i/N.
3.2 Comparison with related estimators for nonlinear panels
This section compares our methodology to alternative estimators for large, nonlinear
panels with fixed effects (Fernandez-Val and Weidner (2016), Charbonneau (2014),
Sun (2016), Chen et al. (2014)).
Fernandez-Val and Weidner (2016) study nonlinear panel data models with indi-
vidual and time fixed effects. Compared to our paper, they assume that the fixed
effects enter the model additively and that the slope coefficients are homogeneous. So
their model can be obtained as a special case of the model (1)-(3) if βi = β, κi = κ and
dt = 1. While the assumption of slope homogeneity is probably too strong in many
applications it has the advantage that faster convergence rates can be obtained. The
contribution of Fernandez-Val and Weidner (2016) is to characterize the bias that
arises due to the incidental parameter problem (Neyman and Scott (1948)) and to
provide analytical and jackknife bias corrections.
Charbonneau (2014) and Sun (2016) also study nonlinear panel data models with
additive fixed effects and homogeneous slopes. Charbonneau (2014) develops a con-
ditional maximum likelihood approach to estimate discrete choice panel data models
with fixed effects which is analogous to the difference-in-differences estimator used
in linear panel data models. Sun (2016)’s estimator is obtained by maximizing a
modified objective function that is not affected by the incidental parameter problem.
Finally, Chen et al. (2014) is probably the paper closest to ours.2 They also
2A related paper is Chen (2014).
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propose an estimator for nonlinear panel data models with interactive fixed effects.
But while the contribution we make is along the lines of simplicity and applicability
and indeed the application, their focus is on developing a comprehensive asymptotic
theory for a wide range of nonlinear panel data models. In particular, they provide
analytical and jackknife corrections for panel data models with interactive fixed effects
to eliminate the incidental parameter bias. From a practitioner’s point of view, ease of
implementation is one advantage of our approach: our estimator is obtained by simply
averaging regression coefficients from probit models estimated for each individual unit
while Chen et al. (2014)’s estimator is computed iteratively in a two-step procedure.
Another important difference to our paper is that Chen et al. (2014) assume that the
slope coefficients are homogeneous so their model is nested in the model (1)-(3) if
βi = β and dt = 1.
4 Asymptotic theory
This section characterizes the large sample properties of both the estimators of the
individual-specific coefficients and the mean group estimator in discrete choice panels
with interactive fixed effects.
Notation: We stack ĥt, ht, and h0t to form the TKx × 1 vectors: ĥ = (X1,1, . . .
, XKx,1, X1,2, . . . , XKx,2, . . . , X1,T , . . . , XKx,T )
ᵀ
, h = (h1,1, . . . , hKx,1, h1,2, . . . , hKx,2,
h1,T , . . . , hKx,T )
ᵀ
, and h0 = (h
0
1,1, . . . , h
0
Kx,1
, h01,2, . . . , h
0
Kx,2
, h01,T , . . . , h
0
Kx,T
)
ᵀ
. These vec-
tors can be embedded within the sequence spaceH whose metric is d(h, g) = supi≥1 |hi−
gi|, in which case we write h = (h01,1, . . . , h0Kx,1, h01,2, . . . , h0Kx,2, h01,T , . . . , h0Kx,T , 0, . . .),
and likewise ĥ, and let ‖h‖H = d(h, 0). We use Θ to denote the finite dimensional
parameter set for θi (where the dependence on i is suppressed) and H for the infinite
dimensional parameter set of sequences {ht}∞t=1.
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4.1 Asymptotic theory for the estimators of the individual-
specific coefficients
This section shows that the estimators of the individual-specific coefficients θ̂i are
consistent and have the same asymptotic distribution as the infeasible estimator θ˜i
that assumes that the unobserved common factors ft are known. Observe that the
vector θ̂i contains both the coefficients of interest β̂i and the auxiliary coefficients
on the known factors dt and the cross-sectional averages X t which play the role of
nuisance parameters. For notational simplicity, the asymptotic theory is presented
for θ̂i, from which one can obtain the theory for the parameter of interest β̂i. Note
that the general framework allows for triangular arrays of random variables, which
we notationally suppress for simplicity.
Define
Qi(θ) = EQiT (θ), (13)
where θ0i is the unique minimum of Q
i(θ) over Θ.
An important condition to derive the asymptotic properties of θ̂i is the uniform
consistency of ĥt. We make the following assumptions:
(B1) E(|ujit|k) ≤ C < ∞, for some k ≥ 6, where ujit denotes the jth element in the
Kx × 1 vector uit
(B2) T,N →∞ such that T/N → 0
Assumption (B1) is required for the trimming argument we make to employ Bern-
stein’s exponential inequality. In condition (B2) we require that the cross sectional
dimension be large relative to the time series dimension.
The following lemma gives an upper bound on the uniform convergence rate of
ĥt − ht.3
Lemma 4.1. Suppose that assumptions (B1)-(B2) hold. Then
‖ĥ− h‖H = Op
(
log T√
N
)
. (14)
3All proofs are relegated to Boneva and Linton (2016).
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We next show that the estimators of the individual-specific coefficients are con-
sistent. Towards this objective, we make the following assumptions:
(C1) The parameter space Θ is compact and θi0 ∈ Θ
(C2) θ̂i ∈ Θ and Q̂iT (θ̂i) = infθ∈Θ Q̂iT (θ)
(C3) θ˜i− θ0i p−→ 0 for each fixed i where θ˜i = arg minθ∈Θ QiT (θ) and QiT (θ) is defined
in (9)
(C4) For δT → 0,
sup
||h−h||H≤δT
sup
θ∈Θ
1
T
T∑
t=1
∣∣qit(θ, ht)− qit(θ, ht)∣∣ = op(1).
Compactness of the parameter space (C1) can be dropped in situations where the
log-likelihood function is globally concave. Assumption (C2) defines the estimator
and can be weakened to Q̂iT (θ̂i) = infθi∈Θ Q̂
i
T (θi) + op(1), Pakes and Pollard (1989).
Consistency of the infeasible estimator θ˜i (assumption (C3)) follows from standard ar-
guments for extremum estimators (e.g. Wald (1949), Newey and McFadden (1994)).
Assumption (C4) ensures that the feasible criterion function approximates the infea-
sible one uniformly well over the parameter space.
Theorem 4.1. Suppose that assumptions (B1)-(B2) and (C1)-(C4) hold. Then, as
(T,N) −→∞ jointly, θ̂i − θ0i p−→ 0 for each fixed i.
We next derive the asymptotic distribution of the individual-specific estimators
θ̂i. In addition, we make the following assumptions.
(D1) As N, T →∞
√
T
(
θ˜i − θ0i
)
d−→ N(0, Vi(θi0, h0)),
where:
Vi = Mi(θ0i, h0)
−1Ji(θi0, h0)Mi(θ0i, h0)−1
ᵀ
lim var
(√
T
∂QiT
∂θ
(θi0)
)
= Ji(θi0, h0)
Mi = Mi(θi0, h0) = p lim
∂2QiT (θi0)
∂θ∂θᵀ
,
and the (Kd + 2Kx)× (Kd + 2Kx) matrix Mi has full rank.
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(D2) For some sequence δT = o(1)
sup
‖h−h‖H<δT
sup
‖θ−θ0i‖≤δT
1
T
T∑
t=1
∥∥∥∥∂2qit(θ, ht)∂θ∂hᵀ − E
(
∂2qit(θ, ht)
∂θ∂hᵀ
)∥∥∥∥ = oP (1)
sup
‖h−h‖H<δT
sup
‖θ−θ0i‖≤δT
1
T
T∑
t=1
∥∥∥∥∂2qit(θ, ht)∂θ∂θᵀ − E
(
∂2qit(θ, ht)
∂θ∂θᵀ
)∥∥∥∥ = oP (1)
(D3) T,N →∞ such that T (log T )2
N
→ 0
Assumption (D1) follows from standard arguments for extremum estimators (e.g.
Wald (1949), Newey and McFadden (1994)). In particular, we have
∂QiT
∂θ
(θi0) = − 1
T
T∑
t=1
Yit − Φit0
Φit0(1− Φit0)φit0zit ≡
1
T
T∑
t=1
vit (15)
is a sample average with zero mean that is i.i.d. conditional on the factors. Here,
Φit0, φit0 denote the c.d.f. and density function evaluated at the true parameter
values θ0i = (α¯
ᵀ
0i, β
ᵀ
0i, κ¯
ᵀ
0i)
ᵀ
. Under our assumptions, Ji = E[vitv
ᵀ
it]. Assumption (D2)
is a uniform convergence condition on the Hessian in a shrinking neighborhood of
the true parameters θi0 and h0 and it can be replaced by a more primitive ULLN
(Andrews (1993)). The restriction on the relative size of T and N in (D3) ensures
that the estimated preliminary functions ĥ do not affect the asymptotic distribution.
Theorem 4.2 summarizes the asymptotic normality result for the individual-specific
estimators θ̂i.
Theorem 4.2. Suppose that assumptions (B1)-(B2), (C1)-(C4), and (D1)-(D3)
hold. Then, as (T,N) −→∞ jointly,
√
T (θ̂i − θ0i) d−→ N(0, Vi)
for each fixed i.
Consistent standard errors may be obtained from the estimator
V̂i =
[
∂2Q̂iT (θ̂i)
∂θ∂θᵀ
]−1 [
1
T
T∑
t=1
v̂itv̂
ᵀ
it
][
∂2Q̂iT (θ̂i)
∂θ∂θᵀ
]−1
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v̂it =
Yit − Φ̂it
Φ̂it(1− Φ̂it)
φ̂itẑit,
where Φ̂it, φ̂it denote the c.d.f. and density function evaluated at the estimated pa-
rameter values.
4.2 Asymptotic theory for the mean group estimator
In this section, we investigate the asymptotic properties of the mean group estimator
β̂ = 1
N
N∑
i=1
β̂i, which is a subset of the parameter estimates contained in θ̂. Consistency
of θ̂ follows by similar arguments as in the case of the individual-specific estimators
θ̂i. We shall assume that the infeasible counterpart θ˜ =
1
N
N∑
i=1
θ˜i is consistent and
asymptotically normal at rate
√
N. This can be established using for example the
arguments of Chen et al. (2016), henceforth CJL, who consider averaging of estimators
in a different context. In their framework, there is no heterogeneity, i.e., θ0i = θ0 for all
i. Furthermore, they emphasize the case where the information about θ0 is decreasing
with i, which is natural for that class of problems. In our case, there is no reason to
impose this structure. On the other hand, we have a simpler weighting scheme (equal
weighting) than they did so we would not require their conditions: A1, A*1, B (4.7),
B3(a) and B4. We also assume a smooth objective function, so we would not require
their conditions A3, A*3, B1, B2, and B3(b). We shall not repeat their conditions
here but just assume the required properties of the infeasible estimators.
We shall show that the feasible estimator approximates the infeasible one, and we
need some additional conditions.
(C3*) θ˜ − θ0 p−→ 0
(C5*) For δT → 0,
max
1≤i≤N
sup
||h−h||H≤δT
sup
θ∈Θ
1
T
T∑
t=1
∣∣qit(θ, ht)− qit(θ, ht)∣∣ = op(1).
Theorem 4.3. Suppose that assumptions (B1)-(B2), (C1), (C2), (C3*),(C4) and
(C5*) hold. Then, as (T,N)→∞ jointly, θ̂ − θ0 p−→ 0.
To show that the mean group estimator is asymptotically normal, we assume that
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θ˜i are uniformly consistent and asymptotically normal.
(E1) Suppose T,N →∞ such that T 2/N(logN)4 →∞.
(E2) Suppose that for some matrix Ω
√
N(θ˜ − θ0) d−→ N(0,Ω),
where Ωβ = Σβ, where Σβ denotes the submatrix of Σ corresponding to β.
(E3) Suppose that
max
1≤i≤N
∥∥∥θ˜i − θi0∥∥∥ = OP ( logN√
T
)
.
(E4) The random variables below are stochastically bounded (for r = 1, . . . , p) :
1
2NT
T∑
t=1
N∑
i=1
∥∥M−1i ∥∥ sup‖h−h‖H<δT
∥∥∥∥ ∂3qit∂θr∂h∂h(θ0i, ht)
∥∥∥∥
1
2NT
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
∥∥M−1i ∥∥ sup‖h−h‖H<δT sup‖θ−θ0i‖≤δT
∥∥∥∥∂3qit(θ, ht)∂θr∂θ∂θᵀ
∥∥∥∥2
max
1≤i≤N
sup
‖θ−θ0i‖≤δT
sup
‖h−h‖H<δT
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
∂2qit(θ, ht)
∂θ∂θᵀ
∥∥∥∥∥ .
Assumptions E are similar to Assumptions D that have been imposed to establish
asymptotic normality of the individual-specific estimators. Condition E3 can be
established in the same way as in Lemma 1, swapping the roles of N and T. Conditions
D3 and E1 are satisfied by many sequences, for example N = T 3/2.
Theorem 4.4 contains the asymptotic normality result for the mean group esti-
mator.
Theorem 4.4. Suppose that assumptions (B1)-(B2), (C1), (C2), (C3*),(C4) and
(C5*), (D1)-(D3), and (E1)-(E4) hold. Then, as (T,N)→∞ jointly,
√
N(β̂ − β0) d−→ N(0,Σβ).
Observe that the asymptotic variance of the mean group estimator is equal to that
of the random coefficients (assumption (A1)). In practice, Σβ can be consistently
estimated by
Σ̂β =
1
N − 1
N∑
i=1
(β̂i − β̂)(β̂i − β̂)ᵀ . (16)
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The estimator Σ̂β is identical to the one that is obtained in OLS and quantile regres-
sion settings (Pesaran (2006), Boneva et al. (2016)).
5 Small sample experiments
To complement the asymptotic results above, this section studies the small sample
properties of the CCE mean group estimator and compares them to the following set
of alternative estimators:
1. The infeasible mean group estimator that counterfactually assumes that the
unknown factors can be observed.
2. The naive mean group estimator that does not account for unobserved common
factors.
3. The linear probability mean group estimator that replaces the probit model by
a linear probability model.
The small sample performance of these estimators is evaluated in five experiments
that cover a wide range of factor structures than can be encountered in economic and
financial panel datasets: 4
Experiment 1 The data generating process (DGP) is
Y ∗it = αi + β1iX1it + β2iX2it + κ1if1t + κ2if2t + it, Yit = I(Y
∗
it ) (17)
Xjit = aji + kji1f1t + kji2f2t + ujit, j = 1, 2 (18)
it ∼ NID(0, 1), ujit ∼ NID(0, 1), j = 1, 2 (19)
4When estimating binary choice models, one occasionally encounters the problem of quasi-
complete separation. Quasi-complete separation occurs when the dependent variable separates the
independent variables to certain degree. In that case, the maximum likelihood estimator does not
exist and attempting to compute it usually results in an upward biased estimate. To mitigate
this problem in the Monte Carlo experiments, we use the bias-reduction method of Firth (1993).
Asymptotically, this estimator is equivalent to maximum likelihood to first order.
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where the factors are generated by5
flt = ρfflt−1 + νlft, t = −50, . . . , T, l = 1, 2 (20)
νlft ∼ NID(µf (1− ρf ), 1− ρ2f ), ρf = 0.5, µf = 0.5, l = 1, 2. (21)
The coefficients αi and aji are held fixed across replications and are initially gen-
erated as: αi ∼ NID(−0.5, 0.1), aji ∼ NID(0.5, 0.1), j = 1, 2. The remaining
coefficients are drawn independently across replications according to β1i = 0.5 + η1i,
η1i ∼ NID(0, 0.02), β2i = −0.5 +η2i, η2i ∼ NID(0, 0.02), κij ∼ NID(0.5, 0.1), kji1 ∼
NID(0.5, 0.1) and kji2 ∼ NID(0.5, 0.1), j = 1, 2,.
Experiment 2 is identical to experiment 1 except that β1i = 0.5, β2i = −0.5 for
all i. There is no slope heterogeneity.
Experiment 3 is identical to experiment 1 except that kji2 ∼ NID(0, 0.1). The
rank condition (7) is not satisfied.
Experiment 4 is identical to experiment 1 except that
Y ∗it = αi + βiXit + κ1if1t + κ2if2t + κ3if3t + it, Yit = I(Y
∗
it ) (22)
where κ3i and f3t are generated as κ1i and f1t. In this experiment, there are more
unknown factors than proxies which illustrates another failure of the rank condition
(7).
Experiment 5 is identical to experiment 1 except that kji2 = 0 for all i, j and
κ2i = 0 for all i. There are more regressors than unobserved factors.
5The DGP for the factors (20) does not satisfy assumption (A2) because the factors are not
bounded. But this does not affect the asymptotic theory because under normality as assumed here,
the penalty term in the uniform rate (Lemma 4.1) is
√
log(T ) which is smaller than the current
penalty of log(T ).
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5.1 Coefficient estimates
To assess the small sample performance of the different estimators, we compute the
maximal bias and RMSE for β1 that are defined as:
RMSEβ =

√√√√ 1
R
R∑
r=1
(β̂1r − β1)2

Biasβ =
(
β1 − 1
R
R∑
r=1
β̂1r
)
,
where R is the number of replications and β̂1r is the estimate of β1 from replication
r.
Table 1 reports RMSE and bias in experiment 1.6 Results for experiments 2-5 are
reported in Boneva and Linton (2016). The naive estimator has poor small sample
properties in all experimental settings. This result is not surprising because this
estimator omits the unobserved common factors that play an important role in the
DGP. In contrast, the CCE mean group estimator is comparable to the infeasible
estimator in terms of RMSE even if the coefficients are homogeneous or if there are
more regressors than unobserved factors. If the rank condition is not satisfied, the
performance of the CCE mean group estimator deteriorates.
We also report empirical sizes, power and coverage probabilities. Power is com-
puted under the alternative β1 = 0.45 and the variance of β̂1 is calculated using
the formula in equation (16). While the naive estimator has distorted empirical sizes
across all experiments, the empirical sizes of the CCE mean group estimator are close
to the nominal size of 5% in all experiments except if the rank condition fails. The
CCE mean group estimator also has good power and coverage probabilities are close
to the nominal level of 95% provided that the rank condition holds.
6The linear probability estimator is excluded in this section because the coefficients represent
marginal effects and are thus not comparable to the other estimates.
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5.2 Marginal effects
Applied research usually reports marginal effects rather than coefficient estimates
when estimating discrete choice models. Unlike coefficient estimates, marginal effects
can be used to assess the economic significance of the results which is important to
inform debates about economic policy. For the probit model, the average marginal
effect for β1i is defined as:
ME1i = β1i
1
T
T∑
t=1
φ(α
ᵀ
i dt + β
ᵀ
iXit + κ
ᵀ
iht).
Bias and RMSE for the mean group marginal effect
N∑
i=1
ME1i/N are computed as
for the coefficient estimates in Section 5.1. The distribution of the marginal effects
follows from delta method applied to
M̂E1i = β̂1i
1
T
T∑
t=1
φ(α̂
ᵀ
i dt + β̂
ᵀ
iXit + κ̂
ᵀ
i ĥt).
Table 2 reports RMSE and bias for marginal effects in experiment 1. Results for
experiments 2-5 are reported in Boneva and Linton (2016). Marginal effects computed
from the CCE mean group estimates have similar bias and RMSE when compared
to the infeasible marginal effects and outperform naive marginal effects that do not
account for unobserved common factors. These conclusions hold even if the rank
condition is not satisfied as in experiments 3 and 4.7 The linear probability model
augmented with cross-sectional averages has good small sample properties, too.8
Overall, the Monte Carlo evidence indicates that the CCE mean group estima-
tor has good small sample properties compared to the infeasible estimator. These
conclusions are robust to the case where coefficients are homogeneous and there are
more regressors than unobserved factors. But the performance of the performance of
the CCE mean group estimator deteriorates if the rank condition fails.
7This is also observed in e.g. Fernandez-Val and Weidner (2016) who show that the robustness
of the marginal effects is due to their convergence rate.
8The linear probability model performs worse if the marginal effects at the average are computed
instead of the average marginal effects. These results are available from the author on request.
19
6 The effect of corporate bond yields on bond is-
suance by US firms
At least since Modigliani and Miller (1958), the capital structure of firms has attracted
much attention and there is a large empirical and theoretical literature that explores
why it matters (e.g. Brealey et al. (2008), Myers (1977)). For example, the mix of
debt and equity is relevant in the presence of the bankruptcy costs or asymmetric
information (Frank and Goyal (2008), Myers and Majluf (1984)).
Relative to equity and bank loans, debt financing is an important source of ex-
ternal funds for US corporations (Denis and Mihov (2003)). Debt financing can take
the form of bank loans, other loans or public debt. The focus here is on public debt:
the corporate bond market has grown rapidly over the last decade when the stock of
corporate bonds doubled (Office of Financial Research (2015)).
There is a large literature discussing the relative merits of bond finance (ICMA
(2013), Langfield and Pagano (2015) and references therein). Compared to equity,
bonds provide a more stable source of funding as investors often hold bonds until
maturity which reduces turnover in secondary markets. Relative to bank loans, bond
financing is less exposed to financial cycles, giving issuers access to funding even
when banks deleverage or even default. For example, during financial crises, market-
based funding substituted for the decline in bank-based finance (Becker and Ivashina
(2014)), thereby contributing to finance trade and investment activities of firms and
consumption expenditure and mortgages of households (ICMA (2013), (Farrant et al.
(2013)).
In this section, we use our estimator to study the effect of corporate bond yields on
the decision of US firms to issue a bond. But in contrast to earlier studies (Frank and
Goyal (2008)), we adopt an incremental approach that investigates the conditional
probability of issuing a corporate bond which is particularly suitable for questions
related to time-variation in the regressors.
Answering the question of how funding costs in corporate bond markets affect
issuance decisions sheds light on a particular transmission mechanism of monetary
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policy: by means of conventional and unconventional monetary policy tools, the cen-
tral bank can affect the interest rates firms face in corporate bond markets. Bond
issuance, on the other hand, is often related to corporate investment and thus aggre-
gate demand (Farrant et al. (2013)).
There is already a large literature that explores the determinants of bond issuance
(e.g. Mizen and Tsoukas (2013), Badoer and James (2016), Adrian et al. (2012), Denis
and Mihov (2003), Becker and Ivashina (2014)). These studies have documented that
issuer characteristics like size, rating, profitability, leverage, equity prices, monetary
policy and the supply of bank credit are important determinants of bond issuance.
Other papers have investigated the effects of Quantitative Easing (Lo Duca et al.
(2014)), asymmetric information (Gomes and Phillips (2012)) or the Basel reforms
on issuance decisions of banks or non-financial corporations (Baba and Inada (2009)).
However, there is not much evidence yet on the effect of yields on bond issuances which
is the contribution of this study. Additionally, previous studies have not controlled for
common unobserved factors that can affect both bond issuance and its determinants.
6.1 Data
The dataset includes bond issuances by US firms between 1990 and 2015 on a monthly
frequency. The sample is restricted to bonds in US dollar, with a fixed coupon and
short-run unsecured collateral. Non-bullet and callable bonds are excluded. The
number of issuances is 5610 with an average size of approximately 300 million USD
made by 1004 different firms. As documented in Figure 1, the distribution of the
number of issuances is highly skewed with many firms only issuing one bond over
the sample period: the average number of issuances is 6 but the median number of
issuances is only 2.
Figure 2 reports time series of the average issuer-specific yield together with the
number of bond issuances between 1990 and 2015. Issuer-specific yields are con-
structed as the median of the individual bond yields. The number of bond issuances
increased sharply around 2003 but fell again during the financial crisis when yields
increased sharply. The time series of the number of issuances for financial sector
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firms co-move closely with the aggregate series.9 Albeit only one quarter of all firms
are in the financial sector, a large number of issuances can be attributed to them.
The co-movement between aggregate and financial sector series can be observed for
average yields, too.
Figure 3a reports the cross-sectional mean, median and dispersion of yields over
time. Yields exhibit a downward trend over the sample period. In 2008, both the
level and the dispersion of yields increased sharply but started to fall again in 2009
which is in part explained by the Quantitative Easing program of the Federal Reserve.
This trend was only reversed with the “Taper Tantrum” in mid-2013 when changes
in expectations about monetary policy triggered an increase in US Treasury yields
with spill-overs to USD denominated bonds. The elevated dispersion as well as the
Taper Tantrum effects are also visible in the distribution of spreads (Figure 3b).
Figure 4a illustrates the unconditional correlation between the cross-sectional av-
erage of yields and the number of issuances per month. For the pre-crisis period,
there is a negative correlation for yields below 8 per cent. When splitting the data by
issuer rating, the pattern is less clear but conditional on a low credit rating, there is
a negative relationship between the number of issuances and yields for yields higher
than 5 per cent (Figure 4b). However, these unconditional correlations could be
driven by common, unobserved shocks which will be controlled for in the regression
analysis below.
6.2 Results
To investigate the effect of yields on bond issuance by US firms, we estimate the
econometric model in (1)-(3) where Yit indicates whether firm i has issued a bond
in month t and Xit contains the issuer’s corporate bond yield and assets at the end
of the previous month.10 11 The observed common factors dt include a constant, a
measure of monetary policy and broker-dealer leverage which is a measure of bank
9The industry classification is according to NACE which is obtained from Bloomberg.
10Yields are winsorized at 0.5% and assets at 0.1%.
11Because our estimator requires estimation of a probit model for each individual cross-sectional
unit, we can only include firms in the estimation that have issued bonds. We assess the robustness
of our results to sample selection in Section 6.3.
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credit conditions (Adrian et al. (2012)). For the pre-crisis period, the stance of
monetary policy is measured by the federal funds rate, and in the post-crisis period,
the change in Federal Reserve Holdings of Treasury Notes is used. In this specific
empirical application, the unobserved factors can represent regulation, changes in
investor behavior such as search for yield, automated trading or policies that aim at
deepening corporate bond markets, for example.
For the empirical analysis, results are reported separately for the pre-and post
crisis period. In the post-crisis period, policies such as Quantitative Easing or credit
guarantee schemes are likely to fundamentally change the incentives for firms to issue
bonds relative to the pre-crisis period. In each estimation sample, the dataset is
restricted to firms with at least 30 time series observations.
Columns 1 to 3 in Table 3 report the CCE mean group estimate of β and marginal
effects for the pre-crisis period. We find that the conditional probability of issuing a
bond is higher if yields are low. This effect is statistically significant when considering
all firms (column 1) or firms that don’t operate in the financial sector (column 3).
But the marginal effects reveal that the effect of yields on issuance is small in absolute
magnitude: the probability of issuing a bond decreases by 0.018 in response to a one
unit change in yields. In contrast, there is no statistically significant effect of yields
on issuance for financial firms, and the effect of firm size is not statistically significant,
too. For comparison, column 4 reports the mean group estimates when the common
factors are omitted which differ from the CCE mean group estimates in size and
statistical significance: for all firms, the marginal effect is only -0.013 compared to
our baseline estimate of -0.018.
Table 4 splits the pre-crisis sample by credit rating. With exception of financial
firms where sample sizes are small, yields are negatively related to the probability of
issuing a bond for low-rated firms but this effect is economically small. In contrast,
the negative relationship between yields and issuance is statistically insignificant con-
ditional on a high credit rating.
The finding that higher yields are associated with less issuance activity of non-
financial firms is observed in the post-crisis period, too (Table 5). As in the pre-crisis
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period, this result is driven by firms with a low credit rating (Table 6). But in contrast
to the pre-crisis period, size has a significant effect on issuance in some specifications:
non-financial corporations that are relatively small are more likely to issue a bond.
One explanation for this finding builds on the substitution from bank loans to bonds
in the post-crisis period (Farrant et al. (2013)). This effect is likely to be stronger
for relatively small firms that relied more heavily on bank loans prior to the financial
crisis.
6.3 Robustness
In this section, we assess the robustness of our results by including additional control
variables, using the corporate spread instead of the yield as a regressor, and apply-
ing alternative sample selection criteria. The results of these robustness checks are
reported in Boneva and Linton (2016).
The finding that yields are negatively related to issuance is robust to augmenting
the baseline specification with a measure of liquidity computed as the share of current
debt in total debt. Additionally, in the pre-crisis period, liquidity has a positive and
significant effect on the conditional probability of issuing a corporate bond. Low
levels of liquidity can be interpreted by investors as a signal for low creditworthiness,
which discourages issuance ex-ante (Mizen and Tsoukas (2013)).
We also find a negative relationship between issuance and funding costs when
replacing yields by spreads in our baseline specification. In particular, the coefficients
on spreads are of similar size when compared to the baseline specification but less
statistically significant in the pre-crisis period.
In our baseline results, we used firms with 30 or more time series observations
over the estimation period. As documented in Boneva and Linton (2016), we find
that our results are robust to using either firms with at least 20 or 40 time series
observations.
Finally, we document that our results are robust to varying the sample of firms.
Our baseline results use all firms that have issued at least one bond during the esti-
mation period. In Boneva and Linton (2016), we replicate our main results when the
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sample is restricted to firms that have issued at least 2 bonds over the estimation pe-
riod. The results of this robustness exercise are quantitatively similar to our baseline
results but statistical significance is lower in the pre-crisis period possibly due to the
much smaller sample size.
7 Conclusions
Economic variables are affected by common shocks such as financial crises, natural
disasters, technological innovation or changes in the political or regulatory environ-
ment. These shocks tend to be difficult to measure and their impact differs across
individual observations. The increased availability of panel data where both the time
series and cross-sectional dimensions are large has motivated researchers to develop
novel estimators that are robust to common shocks (Bai (2009), Pesaran (2006)).
In this paper, we extend the common correlated effects (CCE) estimator of Pe-
saran (2006) where the unobserved factors are approximated with cross-sectional
averages to discrete choice data. In the theoretical part of the paper, we derive the
asymptotic properties and assess the small sample behavior of our estimator. In the
empirical part, the methodology is applied to study the effect of yields on the con-
ditional probability to issue a corporate bond. We find that for non-financial firms,
yields are negatively related to bond issuance of non-financial firms but that effect is
larger in the pre-crisis period compared to the post-crisis period. Splitting the data
by the credit rating of the issuer reveals that the negative relationship between yields
and corporate bond issuance is driven by firms with a low credit rating.
There are many ways in which this work can be developed further. An inter-
esting extension of the empirical application is to examine how participation in a
credit guarantee scheme affects the issuance decisions of firms. These schemes were
adopted in 2008 as part of financial sector rescue packages in order to help banks to
retain access to funding markets (Grande et al. (2011)). In addition, we expect that
constructing a firm-specific measure of credit supply from individual loan data can
reveal additional insights on how yields affect the substitution between bonds and
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loans.
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Table 1: Small sample properties of the mean group estimator β̂: Experiment 1
T/N Bias (× 1000) RMSE (× 1000) Power Size Coverage probability
50 100 200 300 50 100 200 300 50 100 200 300 50 100 200 300 50 100 200 300
Infeasible estimator
50 1.676 2.908 3.371 2.844 35.62 25.18 18.34 14.58 0.272 0.5315 0.861 0.9575 0.049 0.045 0.0485 0.041 0.951 0.955 0.9515 0.959
100 0.0632 0.2128 0.924 0.5095 23.58 16.51 11.62 9.573 0.5345 0.865 0.9935 0.9995 0.0495 0.0435 0.044 0.049 0.9505 0.9565 0.956 0.951
200 0.2336 0.1127 0.3904 0.1257 16.04 11.43 8.042 6.663 0.8625 0.9885 1 1 0.0425 0.0475 0.0455 0.05 0.9575 0.9525 0.9545 0.95
300 -0.2732 0.2284 -0.1364 0.1139 12.86 9.158 6.408 5.36 0.9625 1 1 1 0.0365 0.044 0.0385 0.0455 0.9635 0.956 0.9615 0.9545
CCEMG estimator
50 -2.455 -0.5866 0.8046 0.2931 35.76 24.87 17.81 14.27 0.2325 0.489 0.8205 0.944 0.0535 0.0475 0.0465 0.0465 0.9465 0.9525 0.9535 0.9535
100 -4.728 -3.246 -1.891 -2.265 23.74 16.66 11.71 9.757 0.455 0.817 0.9895 0.9995 0.0535 0.049 0.055 0.0515 0.9465 0.951 0.945 0.9485
200 -4.495 -3.553 -2.543 -2.615 16.82 12.01 8.341 7.076 0.781 0.9775 1 1 0.052 0.0545 0.055 0.064 0.948 0.9455 0.945 0.936
300 -4.948 -3.335 -3.039 -2.615 13.8 9.753 7.147 5.906 0.9275 0.9985 1 1 0.048 0.056 0.061 0.0705 0.952 0.944 0.939 0.9295
Naive estimator
50 157.4 158.2 159 158 161.4 160.7 160.8 159.6 1 1 1 1 0.9985 1 1 1 0.0015 0 0 0
100 157.3 157.7 158.6 157.6 159.1 158.8 159.4 158.3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
200 158.3 158 157.9 158.1 159.1 158.6 158.3 158.5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
300 158.3 158.2 158.1 158.2 158.9 158.6 158.4 158.5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
Notes: The data generating process is defined in (17)-(21). The nominal size is 5% and power is computed under the alternative β1 = 0.45.
The number of replications is set to 2000.
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Table 2: Small sample properties of the marginal effect M̂E: Experiment 1
T/N Bias (× 1000) RMSE (× 1000)
50 100 200 300 50 100 200 300
Infeasible estimator
50 -5.054 -4.752 -4.586 -4.698 10.18 7.812 6.416 5.882
100 -2.632 -2.574 -2.403 -2.51 6.78 5.057 3.893 3.567
200 -1.25 -1.287 -1.205 -1.272 4.519 3.349 2.489 2.207
300 -0.9353 -0.8084 -0.9129 -0.8394 3.644 2.638 1.979 1.692
CCEMG estimator
50 -5.014 -4.837 -4.592 -4.755 10.23 7.86 6.4 5.908
100 -2.718 -2.618 -2.42 -2.574 6.796 5.062 3.908 3.606
200 -1.31 -1.359 -1.238 -1.307 4.629 3.406 2.5 2.213
300 -0.9738 -0.8487 -0.9373 -0.8654 3.698 2.669 2.016 1.695
Naive estimator
50 58.31 58.46 58.67 58.5 59.12 59 59.1 58.87
100 62.33 62.42 62.66 62.36 62.69 62.66 62.86 62.53
200 64.51 64.39 64.35 64.45 64.69 64.52 64.44 64.53
300 65.11 65.07 65.03 65.08 65.22 65.15 65.1 65.14
Linear probability estimator
50 4.978 5.199 5.416 5.286 10.6 8.368 7.164 6.474
100 2.539 2.651 2.867 2.696 6.955 5.221 4.281 3.773
200 1.383 1.346 1.453 1.368 4.776 3.474 2.665 2.3
300 0.8393 0.9552 0.8512 0.937 3.749 2.761 2.025 1.769
Notes: The mean group estimator of the average marginal effect is reported. The data
generating process is defined in (17)-(21). The number of replications is set to 2000.
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Table 3: The effect of yields on bond issuance for US firms in the pre-crisis period
All Financial Other All (no factors)
Coefficient estimates
Yield -0.162 -0.148 -0.217 -0.091
(-1.938) (-0.853) (-2.156) (-2.653)
Size 0.064 0.006 0.067 0.091
(0.281) (0.168) (0.211) (0.543)
Marginal effects
Yield -0.018 -0.006 -0.025 -0.013
Size 0.015 -0.003 0.021 0.021
Observations 321 62 225 321
Notes: The dependent variable is 1 if a firm issues a bond in a particular month and zero
otherwise. Yield is the the firm-specific corporate bond yield and size is measured by
assets/1000. All specifications include a measure of credit supply (leverage in the broker-
dealer market) and the federal funds rate as a common factor. The first column uses all
firms, the second column uses financial sector firms and the third column uses all other
firms (excluding mining and agriculture). The last column reports the results when the
common unobserved factors are omitted. t-statistics are shown in parenthesis.
Table 4: The effect of yields on bond issuance for US firms in the pre-crisis period by
credit rating
All Financial Other
High Low High Low High Low
Coefficient estimates
Yield 0.017 -0.224 -0.185 -0.026 0.033 -0.248
(0.177) (-2.404) (-0.79) (-0.175) (0.325) (-1.923)
Size 0.009 -0.174 0.062 0.006 0.008 -0.243
(0.091) (-1.065) (1.104) (0.298) (0.057) (-0.983)
Marginal effects
Yield 0.001 -0.018 -0.023 0.01 0.003 -0.02
Size -0.005 -0.024 0.006 0 -0.007 -0.033
Observations 135 135 27 28 100 88
Notes: The dependent variable is 1 if a firm issues a bond in a particular month and
zero otherwise. Yield is the firm-specific corporate bond yield and size is measured by
assets/1000. All specifications include a measure of credit supply (leverage in the broker-
dealer market) and the federal funds rate as a common factor. Columns 1-2 use all firms,
columns 3-4 use financial sector firms and columns 5-6 use all other firms (excluding
mining and agriculture). Low (high) means that the issuer has a credit rating below
(above) the sample median. t-statistics are shown in parenthesis.
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Table 5: The effect of yields on bond issuance for US firms in the post-crisis period
All Financial Other All (no factors)
Coefficient estimates
Yield -0.043 -0.004 -0.097 0.011
(-1.056) (-0.074) (-1.896) (0.47)
Size -0.194 -0.028 -0.245 -0.115
(-2.62) (-0.488) (-2.448) (-1.945)
Marginal effects
Yield -0.007 0.003 -0.015 -0.002
Size -0.024 -0.006 -0.03 -0.015
Observations 378 72 273 378
Notes: The dependent variable is 1 if a firm issues a bond in a particular month and
zero otherwise. Yield is the firm-specific corporate bond yield and size is measured by
assets/1000. All specifications include a measure of credit supply (leverage in the broker-
dealer market) and the change in Federal Reserve Holdings of Treasury Notes as common
factors. The first column uses all firms, the second column uses financial sector firms
and the third column uses all other firms (excluding mining and agriculture). The last
column reports the results when the common unobserved factors are omitted. t-statistics
are shown in parenthesis.
Table 6: The effect of yields on bond issuance for US firms in the post-crisis period by
credit rating
All Financial Other
High Low High Low High Low
Coefficient estimates
Yield 0.031 -0.085 0.052 -0.045 0.016 -0.194
(0.6) (-1.174) (0.599) (-0.501) (0.247) (-2.043)
Size -0.007 -0.196 -0.032 -0.045 -0.005 -0.258
(-0.06) (-4.37) (-0.314) (-1.487) (-0.033) (-4.317)
Marginal effects
Yield 0.004 -0.012 0.01 -0.001 0.002 -0.027
Size -0.004 -0.025 -0.01 -0.006 -0.003 -0.033
Observations 160 160 40 25 113 112
Notes: The dependent variable is 1 if a firm issues a bond in a particular month and
zero otherwise. Yield the firm-specific corporate bond yield and size is measured by
assets/1000. All specifications include a measure of credit supply (leverage in the broker-
dealer market) and the change in Federal Reserve Holdings of Treasury Notes as common
factors. Columns 1-2 use all firms, columns 3-4 use financial sector firms and columns 5-6
use all other firms (excluding mining and agriculture). Low (high) means that the issuer
has a credit rating below (above) the sample median. t-statistics are shown in parenthesis.
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Figure 1: Histogram for the number of issuances by firm
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Notes: Data sources: Bloomberg, Datastream and own calculations.
Figure 2: Number of bond issuances per month and cross-sectional average of
issuer-specific bond yields
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Notes: Number of bond issuances are computed as 6-month moving sums. Data sources:
Bloomberg, Datastream and own calculations.
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Figure 3: Cross-sectional distribution of issuer-specific bond yields and spreads
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Notes: Data sources: Bloomberg, Datastream and own calculations.
Figure 4: Unconditional correlations between the number of issuances per month and
cross-sectional average of bond yields
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1 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 4.1
We have
max
1≤t≤T
‖ĥt − ht‖ = max
1≤t≤T
‖ut‖ = max
1≤t≤T
∣∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
i=1
uit
∣∣∣∣∣ .
Define the event
B = {|uit| ≤ τN,T for all i ≤ N, t ≤ T} , (1)
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where τN,T <∞ is to be determined below. We have for any x > 0
Pr
(√
N max
1≤t≤T
‖ĥt − ht‖ > x
)
≤ Pr
({√
N max
1≤t≤T
‖ĥt − ht‖ > x
}
∩B
)
+ Pr(Bc)
Then by Bonferroni and Bernstein’s inequality (Van der Vaart, 1998, p285)
Pr
({√
N max
1≤t≤T
‖ĥt − ht‖ > x
}
∩B
)
≤ 2T exp
(
−1
2
x2
σ2u + xτN,T/
√
N
)
,
where we use that uit are i.i.d with mean zero and finite variance σ
2
u. Then, taking x = log T we have
Pr
({√
N max
1≤t≤T
‖ĥt − ht‖ > log T
}
∩B
)
≤ 2T exp
(
−1
2
log2 T
σ2u + τN,T log T/
√
N
)
= o(1)
provided τN,T log T/
√
N → 0. Furthermore, we note that with τN,T = (NT )pi for some pi > 0, we
have
Pr(B) = F|u| (τN,T )
NT ≥
(
1− c
(NT )piα
)NT
,
where F|u| denotes the c.d.f. of the random variable |uit|. The moment conditions imply that F|u|(x) ≥
1 − cx−α for x large for α ≥ 4. If piα > 1, then Pr(B) → 1. Therefore, provided pi > 1/α and
Npi−1/2T pi log T → 0 the result is established.
Proof of Theorem 4.1
Because the infeasible estimator θ˜i is consistent, it suffices to show that estimating the unobserved
factors does not affect the criterion function. We have
Pr
(
sup
θ∈Θ
∣∣∣Q̂iT (θ)−QiT (θ)∣∣∣ ≥ )
≤ Pr
(
sup
||h−h‖H≤δT
sup
θ∈Θ
1
T
T∑
t=1
∣∣qit(θ, ht)− qit(θ, ht)∣∣ ≥ 
)
+ Pr
(
||ĥ− h‖H > δT
)
(2)
→ 0, (3)
Proof of Theorem 4.2
To show that θ̂i is asymptotically normal, it suffices to show that estimating the unobserved factors
does not affect the limiting distribution, that is,
√
T
(
θ̂i − θ˜i
)
= oP (1). (4)
2
By the Mean Value Theorem, we have
0 =
1
T
T∑
t=1
∂qit(θ̂i, ĥt)
∂θ
=
1
T
T∑
t=1
∂qit(θ˜i, ĥt)
∂θ
+
1
T
T∑
t=1
∂2qit(θ˜i, h
∗
t )
∂θ∂θᵀ
(
θ̂i − θ˜i
)
=
1
T
T∑
t=1
∂qit(θ˜i, ht)
∂θ
+
1
T
T∑
t=1
∂2qit(θ˜i, h
∗∗
t )
∂θ∂hᵀ
(
ĥt − ht
)
+
1
T
T∑
t=1
∂2qit(θ˜i, h
∗
t )
∂θ∂θᵀ
(
θ̂i − θ˜i
)
=
1
T
T∑
t=1
∂2qit(θ˜i, h
∗∗
t )
∂θ∂hᵀ
(
ĥt − ht
)
+
1
T
T∑
t=1
∂2qit(θ˜i, h
∗
t )
∂θ∂θᵀ
(
θ̂i − θ˜i
)
,
where h∗t and h
∗∗
t are intermediate values. Then, provided
lim inf
N,T→∞
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
∂2qit(θ˜i, h
∗
t )
∂θ∂θᵀ
∥∥∥∥∥ > 0
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
∂2qit(θ˜i, h
∗∗
t )
∂θ∂hᵀ
(
ĥt − ht
)∥∥∥∥∥ = oP (T−1/2).
the result (4) follows. These properties follow from the uniform convergence of ĥt − ht, the Cauchy-
Schwarz inequality and conditions D. For example, with probability tending to one∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
∂2qit(θ˜i, h
∗∗
t )
∂θ∂hᵀ
(
ĥt − ht
)∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤ 1
T
T∑
t=1
∥∥∥∥∥∂2qit(θ˜i, h∗∗t )∂θ∂hᵀ
∥∥∥∥∥
2
×
∥∥∥ĥ− h∥∥∥2
H
≤ sup
‖h−h‖H<δT
sup
‖θ−θ0i‖≤δT
1
T
T∑
t=1
∥∥∥∥∂2qit(θ, ht)∂θ∂θᵀ
∥∥∥∥2 × ∥∥∥ĥ− h∥∥∥2H
= OP
(
log2 T
N
)
= oP (T
−1)
Proof of Theorem 4.3
It suffices to show that the feasible objective functions are uniformly close to the infeasible ones, see
CJL (2016). Thus
Pr
(
max
1≤i≤N
sup
θ∈Θ
∣∣∣Q̂iT (θ)−QiT (θ)∣∣∣ ≥ )
≤ Pr
(
max
1≤i≤N
sup
||h−h‖H≤δT
sup
θ∈Θ
∣∣∣∣∣ 1T
T∑
t=1
qit(θ, ht)− qit(θ, ht)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ 
)
+ Pr
(
||ĥ− h‖H > δT
)
≤ Pr
(
max
1≤i≤N
sup
||h−h‖H≤δT
sup
θ∈Θ
1
T
T∑
t=1
∣∣qit(θ, ht)− qit(θ, ht)∣∣ ≥ 
)
+ Pr
(
||ĥ− h‖H > δT
)
3
→ 0. (5)
Proof of Theorem 4.4
We show that
θ̂ − θ˜ = oP (N−1/2). (6)
The estimators θ˜i and θ̂i, i = 1, . . . , N satisfy the first order conditions
1
T
T∑
t=1
∂qit(θ˜i, ht)
∂θ
= 0 =
1
T
T∑
t=1
∂qit(θ̂i, ĥt)
∂θ
.
We first work with a linear approximation to θ̂i. Define
LT i(θ) =
1
T
T∑
t=1
∂qit(θ˜i, ĥt)
∂θ
+Mi
(
θ − θ˜i
)
(7)
from which we obtain for θ̂∗i such that LT i(θ̂
∗
i ) = 0,
θ̂∗i − θ˜i = −M−1i
1
T
T∑
t=1
∂qit(θ˜i, ĥt)
∂θ
.
We first establish the result for this linear approximation. By the Mean-Value Theorem, we have for
r = 1, . . . , p
1
T
T∑
t=1
∂qit(θ˜i, ĥt)
∂θr
=
1
T
T∑
t=1
∂qit(θ0i, ht)
∂θr
+
1
T
T∑
t=1
∂2qit(θ0i, ht)
∂θr∂h
ᵀ
(
ĥt − ht
)
+
1
T
T∑
t=1
∂2qit(θ0i, ht)
∂θr∂θ
ᵀ
(
θ˜i − θ0i
)
+
1
2T
T∑
t=1
(ĥt − ht)ᵀ ∂
3qit
∂θr∂h∂h
(θ∗i , h
∗
t )(ĥt − ht) +
(
θ˜i − θ0i
)ᵀ 1
2T
T∑
t=1
∂3qit(θ
∗
i , h
∗
t )
∂θr∂θ∂h
ᵀ
(
ĥt − ht
)
+
(
θ˜i − θ0i
)ᵀ 1
2T
T∑
t=1
∂3qit(θ
∗
i , h
∗
t )
∂θr∂θ∂θ
ᵀ
(
θ˜i − θ0i
)
=
6∑
k=1
Jrk;i,
where h∗t and θ
∗
i are intermediate values. It follows that
1
N
N∑
i=1
(
θ̂∗i − θ˜i
)
=
6∑
k=1
1
N
N∑
i=1
M−1i × J·k;i ≡
6∑
k=1
Rrk, (8)
where J·k;i denotes the vector with rth element Jrk;i. We consider in sequence the vector random
variables R1 −R6.
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We have E(R1) = 0 and ∂q
i
t(θ0i, ht)/∂θ is i.i.d. across i and t conditional on X, d, f, so that
R1 =
1
N
N∑
i=1
M−1i
1
T
T∑
t=1
∂qit(θ0i, ht)
∂θ
=
1
N
1
T
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
M−1i
∂qit(θ0i, ht)
∂θ
= OP (N
−1/2T−1/2).
Consider
R2 =
1
T
T∑
t=1
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
M−1i
∂2qit
∂θ∂h
(θ0i, ht)
)
(ĥt − ht). (9)
We have ∂Φit0/∂ht = φit0κi and ∂φit0/∂ht = −θᵀi0zitφit0κi, whence
∂2qit
∂θ∂h
(θ0i, ht) =
1
T
−φ2it0zitκi
Φit0(1− Φit0)
− 1
T
Yit − Φit0
(Φit0(1− Φit0))2 (1− 2Φit0))φ
2
it0zitκi
− 1
T
Yit − Φit0
Φit0(1− Φit0)
(
θ
ᵀ
i0zit
)
φ2it0κizit.
We decompose (9) into three terms: the second and third terms are just linear combinations of the
random variables Yit − Φit0, which are i.i.d. mean zero conditional on the factors; the first term is
different and we treat this more carefully. This term can be written as
WNT =
1
N2T
N∑
i=1
N∑
l=1
T∑
t=1
ri(dt, ft, ut, uit)ult
for some function ri(·). Write for each l = 1, . . . , N
ri(dt, ft, uit, uit) = ri(dt, ft, u
−l
t , uit) + ri;3(dt, ft, u
−l
t , uit)
ult
N
+
1
2
+ ri;33(dt, ft, u
−l∗
t , uit)
u2lt
N2
for some intermediate value u−l∗t , where u
−l
t =
∑
j 6=l ujt/N so that ut − u−lt = ult/N. We have for
l 6= i, E (ri;3(dt, ft, u−lt , uit)ult) = 0 and E (∣∣ri;33(dt, ft, u−l∗t , uit)∣∣u2lt) <∞. From this we obtain that
E(WNT ) = O(N
−1).
By similar arguments we obtain
E
(
W 2NT
)
=
1
N4T 2
N∑
i=1
N∑
l=1
N∑
i′=1
N∑
l′=1
T∑
t=1
T∑
t′=1
E
[
ri(dt, ft, uit, uit)ri′(dt′ , ft′ , ui′t′ , ui′t′)
ᵀ
ultul′t′
]
= O(N−1T−1),
because whenever either t 6= t′ or all four indices in {i, i′, l, l′} are distinct, then the expectation is
zero for the leave out case, or small otherwise. Therefore,
WNT = OP (N
−1) +OP (N−1/2T−1/2). (10)
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In conclusion, R2 = OP (N
−1) +OP (N−1/2T−1/2). We have
R3 =
1
N
N∑
i=1
M−1i
1
T
T∑
t=1
∂2qit(θ0i, ht)
∂θ∂θᵀ
(
θ˜i − θ0i
)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(
M−1i
1
T
T∑
t=1
∂2qit(θ0i, ht)
∂θ∂θᵀ
)(
θ˜i − θ0i
)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(
θ˜i − θ0i
)
+
1
N
N∑
i=1
(
M−1i
1
T
T∑
t=1
∂2qit(θ0i, ht)
∂θ∂θᵀ
− Ip
)(
θ˜i − θ0i
)
= oP (N
−1/2) +OP (T−1) = oP (N−1/2),
by Cauchy-Schwarz and the assumption that T 2/N → 0. The remaining terms, R4 − R6 are also
treated by crude bounding. For example, with probability tending to one
max
1≤i≤N
∥∥∥∥∥ 1N
N∑
i=1
M−1i
1
2T
T∑
t=1
(ĥt − ht)ᵀ ∂
3qit
∂θr∂h∂h
(θ0i, h
∗
t )(ĥt − ht)
∥∥∥∥∥
≤ ‖ĥ− h‖2H ×
1
2NT
T∑
t=1
N∑
i=1
∥∥M−1i ∥∥ sup‖h−h‖H<δT
∥∥∥∥ ∂3qit∂θr∂h∂h(θ0i, ht)
∥∥∥∥
= OP
(
log2 T
N
)
= oP (N
−1/2).
∥∥∥∥∥ 1N
N∑
i=1
M−1i
(
θ˜i − θ0i
)ᵀ 1
2T
T∑
t=1
∂3qit(θ
∗
i , h
∗
t )
∂θr∂θ∂θ
ᵀ
(
θ˜i − θ0i
)∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤ max
1≤i≤N
∥∥∥θ˜i − θ0i∥∥∥2 × 1
2NT
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
∥∥M−1i ∥∥ sup‖h−h‖H<δT sup‖θ−θ0i‖≤δT
∥∥∥∥∂3qit(θ, ht)∂θr∂θ∂θᵀ
∥∥∥∥2
= OP
(
log2N
T
)
= oP (N
−1/2).
Finally, we show that the linear approximation is very close to the actual score function of the feasible
estimator
√
N max
1≤i≤N
sup
‖θ−θ0i‖≤δN
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
∂qit(θ, ĥt)
∂θ
− LT i(θ)
∥∥∥∥∥
=
√
N max
1≤i≤N
sup
‖θ−θ0i‖≤δT
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
(
θ − θ˜i
)ᵀ ∂2qit(θ, ĥt)
∂θ∂θᵀ
(
θ − θ˜i
)∥∥∥∥∥
≤
√
N × max
1≤i≤N
∥∥∥θ˜i − θ0i∥∥∥2 × max
1≤i≤N
sup
‖θ−θ0i‖≤δT
sup
‖h−h‖H<δT
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
∂2qit(θ, ht)
∂θ∂θᵀ
∥∥∥∥∥
6
= oP (1).
The argument follows as in CJL (2016, p68).
2 Additional tables for the simulation study
Tables 1-8 report the results for experiments 2-5 that are discussed in Section 5 of the main paper.
3 Tables for the robustness checks
Tables 9 to 12 report the results of our robustness checks that are discussed in Section 6.3 of the
main paper.
7
Table 1: Small sample properties of the mean group estimator β̂: Experiment 2
T/N Bias (× 1000) RMSE (× 1000) Power Size Coverage probability
50 100 200 300 50 100 200 300 50 100 200 300 50 100 200 300 50 100 200 300
Infeasible estimator
50 2.588 3.869 2.846 3.258 36.37 25.64 17.93 14.53 0.2875 0.556 0.851 0.9605 0.0545 0.049 0.042 0.0525 0.9455 0.951 0.958 0.9475
100 0.107 1.415 0.8318 0.9228 23.31 16.49 11.33 9.243 0.551 0.882 0.995 0.9995 0.0465 0.0455 0.0375 0.039 0.9535 0.9545 0.9625 0.961
200 0.1966 0.2106 0.03057 0.03981 15.79 11.19 8.039 6.47 0.874 0.9935 1 1 0.044 0.0465 0.0475 0.0475 0.956 0.9535 0.9525 0.9525
300 -0.4161 -0.04835 0.3275 0.1518 12.74 9.074 6.46 5.131 0.965 1 1 1 0.0405 0.036 0.0445 0.039 0.9595 0.964 0.9555 0.961
CCEMG estimator
50 -1.487 0.6606 -0.0882 0.6682 36.15 25.12 17.64 14.18 0.2525 0.508 0.805 0.945 0.0565 0.0435 0.0485 0.0435 0.9435 0.9565 0.9515 0.9565
100 -4.385 -2.043 -2.021 -1.73 23.74 16.48 11.53 9.341 0.4755 0.837 0.9905 0.999 0.047 0.0505 0.0455 0.0475 0.953 0.9495 0.9545 0.9525
200 -4.581 -3.372 -2.91 -2.7 16.53 11.72 8.584 7.009 0.7905 0.984 1 1 0.0535 0.061 0.07 0.0655 0.9465 0.939 0.93 0.9345
300 -5.233 -3.586 -2.63 -2.578 13.71 9.784 6.978 5.745 0.925 0.999 1 1 0.063 0.064 0.0675 0.0665 0.937 0.936 0.9325 0.9335
Naive estimator
50 158.7 159.4 158.7 158.1 162.5 161.9 160.4 159.6 1 1 1 1 0.9985 1 1 1 0.0015 0 0 0
100 157.2 158.6 158.3 158.2 159 159.8 159.1 158.9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
200 158.1 158.1 157.9 157.9 159 158.7 158.3 158.2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
300 157.8 158 158.3 158.4 158.3 158.4 158.6 158.6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
Notes: The data generating process is defined in (17)-(21) (in the main paper) except that β1i = 0.5, for all i. The nominal size is 5% and
power is computed under the alternative β1 = 0.45. The number of replications is set to 2000.
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Table 2: Small sample properties of the mean group estimator β̂: Experiment 3
T/N Bias (× 1000) RMSE (× 1000) Power Size Coverage probability
50 100 200 300 50 100 200 300 50 100 200 300 50 100 200 300 50 100 200 300
Infeasible estimator
50 1.604 2.332 2.829 2.293 34.93 25.5 17.7 14.86 0.2645 0.5355 0.862 0.954 0.045 0.05 0.0455 0.045 0.955 0.95 0.9545 0.955
100 1.35 0.4999 0.4462 0.686 23.16 16.77 11.83 9.817 0.567 0.8585 0.9925 1 0.046 0.0525 0.0475 0.052 0.954 0.9475 0.9525 0.948
200 0.8779 0.1244 -0.1658 0.4899 15.91 10.92 7.969 6.4 0.8725 0.994 1 1 0.039 0.036 0.0425 0.0365 0.961 0.964 0.9575 0.9635
300 0.3728 0.01739 0.1115 0.09328 12.83 9.209 6.444 5.294 0.9675 1 1 1 0.0365 0.0415 0.039 0.0415 0.9635 0.9585 0.961 0.9585
CCEMG estimator
50 -47.5 -46.79 -45.93 -45.71 57.33 52.61 49.07 48.35 0.0345 0.049 0.0485 0.084 0.276 0.477 0.7375 0.8565 0.724 0.523 0.2625 0.1435
100 -49.81 -49.47 -49.06 -48.69 54.28 52.06 50.51 49.76 0.0245 0.033 0.049 0.06 0.512 0.815 0.975 0.997 0.488 0.185 0.025 0.003
200 -50.81 -50.54 -50.53 -49.83 53 51.62 51.16 50.29 0.01 0.0155 0.016 0.0215 0.784 0.989 1 1 0.216 0.011 0 0
300 -51.54 -50.86 -50.3 -50.2 53.01 51.63 50.74 50.52 0.0075 0.0085 0.012 0.0205 0.9055 0.998 1 1 0.0945 0.002 0 0
Naive estimator
50 56.46 56.73 56.68 57.78 66.45 63.91 61.78 62.62 0.9115 0.9855 0.9995 0.9995 0.428 0.679 0.847 0.907 0.572 0.321 0.153 0.093
100 56.55 55.25 56.1 55.67 61.54 58.81 58.53 58.02 0.997 1 1 1 0.6635 0.8775 0.974 0.987 0.3365 0.1225 0.026 0.013
200 56.32 55.77 55.1 55.82 58.73 57.34 56.29 56.87 1 1 1 1 0.891 0.9915 1 1 0.109 0.0085 0 0
300 55.23 55.31 55.67 55.55 56.93 56.39 56.49 56.26 1 1 1 1 0.958 0.999 1 1 0.042 0.001 0 0
Notes: The data generating process is defined in (17)-(21) (in the main paper) except that kji2 ∼ NID(0, 0.1). The nominal size is 5%
and power is computed under the alternative β1 = 0.45. The number of replications is set to 2000.
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Table 3: Small sample properties of the mean group estimator β̂: Experiment 4
T/N Bias (× 1000) RMSE (× 1000) Power Size Coverage probability
50 100 200 300 50 100 200 300 50 100 200 300 50 100 200 300 50 100 200 300
Infeasible estimator
50 2.221 1.969 2.262 2.177 38.46 26.95 19.07 15.65 0.2515 0.466 0.7935 0.929 0.0495 0.045 0.043 0.0475 0.9505 0.955 0.957 0.9525
100 -0.06905 0.765 0.8125 0.9479 24.85 17.22 12.25 10.08 0.505 0.8375 0.985 0.999 0.0535 0.045 0.0425 0.0475 0.9465 0.955 0.9575 0.9525
200 0.251 0.58 0.43 0.3177 16.47 11.69 8.278 6.73 0.838 0.9905 1 1 0.0365 0.039 0.037 0.0445 0.9635 0.961 0.963 0.9555
300 0.1099 -0.1997 -0.03769 -0.17 13.23 9.397 6.761 5.432 0.9575 0.9995 1 1 0.039 0.039 0.041 0.0335 0.961 0.961 0.959 0.9665
CCEMG estimator
50 -52.04 -51.04 -50.59 -50.92 62.59 56.95 54.08 53.54 0.0595 0.058 0.0815 0.1005 0.344 0.548 0.7995 0.915 0.656 0.452 0.2005 0.085
100 -55.59 -54.52 -53.57 -53.44 60 56.86 54.99 54.55 0.049 0.0565 0.0875 0.1135 0.6535 0.9035 0.99 0.998 0.3465 0.0965 0.01 0.002
200 -56.03 -55.2 -54.65 -54.54 58.13 56.31 55.33 55.02 0.061 0.07 0.1085 0.141 0.926 0.9985 1 1 0.074 0.0015 0 0
300 -56.61 -55.81 -55.47 -55.12 57.94 56.56 55.88 55.43 0.065 0.0955 0.1475 0.181 0.9895 1 1 1 0.0105 0 0 0
Naive estimator
50 102.3 103.1 102.5 101.3 109.3 108 106.7 105.1 0.9955 1 1 1 0.8765 0.9715 0.995 0.9995 0.1235 0.0285 0.005 0
100 100.4 100.7 101.3 101.5 103.6 102.9 103.1 103.1 0.9995 1 1 1 0.9915 0.9995 1 1 0.0085 0 0 0
200 101.1 100.6 101.1 101.1 102.7 101.6 102 101.9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
300 100.7 100.4 100.5 100.7 101.8 101.1 101.1 101.3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
Notes: The data generating process is defined in (17)-(21) and (22) (in the main paper). The nominal size is 5% and power is computed
under the alternative β1 = 0.45. The number of replications is set to 2000.
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Table 4: Small sample properties of the mean group estimator β̂: Experiment 5
T/N Bias (× 1000) RMSE (× 1000) Power Size Coverage probability
50 100 200 300 50 100 200 300 50 100 200 300 50 100 200 300 50 100 200 300
Infeasible estimator
50 2.741 2.228 2.859 2.14 33.89 23.81 17.09 13.41 0.3005 0.5715 0.8825 0.9705 0.041 0.0465 0.0475 0.038 0.959 0.9535 0.9525 0.962
100 1.931 0.5019 0.5716 0.4187 22.8 15.45 11.26 9.172 0.5995 0.8905 0.996 1 0.053 0.0365 0.043 0.0505 0.947 0.9635 0.957 0.9495
200 0.1784 0.1349 0.1921 0.1349 15.37 10.74 7.521 6.425 0.8875 0.9935 1 1 0.0495 0.032 0.04 0.0405 0.9505 0.968 0.96 0.9595
300 -0.1834 -0.2191 0.0583 0.1146 12.55 8.898 6.36 5.097 0.9695 1 1 1 0.041 0.0435 0.0435 0.046 0.959 0.9565 0.9565 0.954
CCEMG estimator
50 0.9652 1.81 2.908 2.42 34.33 24.39 17.38 13.64 0.271 0.5495 0.87 0.973 0.041 0.0465 0.044 0.037 0.959 0.9535 0.956 0.963
100 -0.2707 -0.532 0.08839 0.1874 22.99 15.63 11.32 9.253 0.549 0.866 0.9945 0.9995 0.0495 0.04 0.046 0.047 0.9505 0.96 0.954 0.953
200 -2.298 -1.033 -0.3968 -0.2565 15.65 10.82 7.547 6.443 0.8455 0.99 1 1 0.047 0.035 0.041 0.0415 0.953 0.965 0.959 0.9585
300 -2.6 -1.443 -0.5476 -0.3022 12.94 9.048 6.409 5.125 0.949 1 1 1 0.051 0.0475 0.0445 0.046 0.949 0.9525 0.9555 0.954
Naive estimator
50 113.4 113.8 113.5 112.5 118.4 116.8 115.5 114.1 1 1 1 1 0.941 0.998 1 1 0.059 0.002 0 0
100 113.5 112.3 112.4 112.1 115.8 113.6 113.3 112.9 1 1 1 1 0.9995 1 1 1 5e-04 0 0 0
200 112.6 112.6 112.6 112.3 113.6 113.3 113 112.6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
300 112.6 112.3 112.8 112.5 113.3 112.7 113.1 112.7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
Notes: The data generating process is defined in (17)-(21) (in the main paper) except that kji2 = 0 ∀i, j and κ2i = 0 ∀i. The nominal size
is 5% and power is computed under the alternative β1 = 0.45. The number of replications is set to 2000.
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Table 5: Small sample properties of the marginal effect M̂E: Experiment 4
T/N Bias (× 1000) RMSE (× 1000)
50 100 200 300 50 100 200 300
Infeasible estimator
50 -4.939 -4.988 -4.945 -4.932 10.07 7.935 6.572 6.071
100 -2.63 -2.426 -2.451 -2.412 6.627 4.859 3.864 3.451
200 -1.231 -1.146 -1.193 -1.216 4.334 3.157 2.4 2.087
300 -0.8167 -0.9001 -0.8656 -0.9018 3.458 2.563 1.922 1.651
CCEMG estimator
50 -5.156 -5.015 -4.912 -4.96 10.06 7.908 6.482 6.087
100 -2.663 -2.493 -2.457 -2.43 6.666 4.881 3.875 3.449
200 -1.264 -1.176 -1.204 -1.222 4.411 3.19 2.416 2.108
300 -0.9125 -0.9155 -0.903 -0.9022 3.542 2.617 1.949 1.672
Naive estimator
50 54.03 54.25 54.07 53.73 55.17 55.17 54.87 54.46
100 57.75 57.95 58.01 58.21 58.32 58.37 58.38 58.55
200 59.99 59.9 59.97 59.97 60.27 60.1 60.15 60.14
300 60.52 60.38 60.53 60.49 60.7 60.52 60.64 60.61
Linear probability estimator
50 4.402 4.511 4.652 4.57 10.16 7.901 6.498 5.96
100 2.369 2.574 2.565 2.575 6.82 5.066 4.039 3.636
200 1.296 1.401 1.365 1.368 4.527 3.356 2.553 2.232
300 0.812 0.8319 0.8303 0.8355 3.631 2.657 1.95 1.664
Notes: The mean group estimator of the average marginal effect is is reported. The data generating
process is defined in (17)-(21) and (22) (in the main paper). The number of replications is set to
2000.
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Table 6: Small sample properties of the marginal effect M̂E: Experiment 5
T/N Bias (× 1000) RMSE (× 1000)
50 100 200 300 50 100 200 300
Infeasible estimator
50 -4.699 -4.763 -4.657 -4.821 10.04 7.882 6.44 5.971
100 -2.127 -2.531 -2.511 -2.549 6.709 5.037 4.044 3.619
200 -1.262 -1.289 -1.274 -1.286 4.599 3.35 2.509 2.242
300 -0.9358 -0.9462 -0.8643 -0.8519 3.759 2.741 2.037 1.703
CCEMG estimator
50 -5.962 -5.954 -5.863 -6.014 10.76 8.716 7.395 6.977
100 -2.843 -3.216 -3.225 -3.244 7.028 5.451 4.532 4.148
200 -1.672 -1.66 -1.652 -1.662 4.76 3.517 2.723 2.477
300 -1.195 -1.2 -1.119 -1.11 3.872 2.847 2.162 1.849
Naive estimator
50 40.28 40.56 40.45 40.03 41.5 41.38 41.04 40.56
100 44.19 43.91 43.92 43.82 44.74 44.25 44.19 44.05
200 45.81 45.84 45.82 45.75 46.06 46.01 45.94 45.85
300 46.49 46.36 46.53 46.41 46.65 46.47 46.61 46.48
Linear probability estimator
50 4.937 4.867 4.945 4.805 10.63 8.276 6.815 6.093
100 2.921 2.508 2.51 2.492 7.253 5.199 4.134 3.663
200 1.263 1.279 1.294 1.28 4.745 3.441 2.586 2.275
300 0.7918 0.791 0.857 0.87 3.859 2.752 2.082 1.734
Notes: The mean group estimator of the average marginal effect is is reported. The data generating
process is defined in (17)-(21) (in the main paper) except that kji2 = 0 ∀i, j and κ2i = 0 ∀i. The
number of replications is set to 2000.
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Table 7: Small sample properties of the marginal effect M̂E: Experiment 2
T/N Bias (× 1000) RMSE (× 1000)
50 100 200 300 50 100 200 300
Infeasible estimator
50 -4.741 -4.475 -4.7 -4.618 10.2 7.754 6.463 5.827
100 -2.622 -2.282 -2.425 -2.409 6.707 4.909 3.868 3.424
200 -1.268 -1.253 -1.313 -1.304 4.476 3.286 2.546 2.194
300 -0.9855 -0.8788 -0.7807 -0.8276 3.626 2.627 1.937 1.633
CCEMG estimator
50 -4.727 -4.542 -4.78 -4.672 10.25 7.779 6.516 5.86
100 -2.629 -2.333 -2.454 -2.432 6.764 4.935 3.903 3.445
200 -1.336 -1.308 -1.35 -1.338 4.575 3.336 2.589 2.219
300 -1.064 -0.9193 -0.8168 -0.851 3.673 2.665 1.964 1.648
Naive estimator
50 58.65 58.76 58.74 58.45 59.42 59.3 59.14 58.82
100 62.27 62.64 62.62 62.55 62.65 62.91 62.81 62.73
200 64.44 64.45 64.38 64.34 64.62 64.57 64.47 64.43
300 64.96 65.03 65.12 65.12 65.07 65.11 65.18 65.17
Linear probability estimator
50 5.321 5.5 5.257 5.382 11.03 8.676 7.041 6.571
100 2.726 2.936 2.806 2.847 7.057 5.369 4.222 3.827
200 1.328 1.407 1.34 1.355 4.684 3.468 2.626 2.264
300 0.7718 0.9124 0.992 0.9621 3.68 2.719 2.082 1.742
Notes: The mean group estimator of the average marginal effect is reported. The data generating
process is defined in (17)-(21) (in the main paper) except that β1i = 0.5, for all i. The number of
replications is set to 2000.
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Table 8: Small sample properties of the marginal effect M̂E: Experiment 3
T/N Bias (× 1000) RMSE (× 1000)
50 100 200 300 50 100 200 300
Infeasible estimator
50 -4.954 -4.816 -4.75 -4.867 10.01 7.908 6.449 6.085
100 -2.297 -2.499 -2.527 -2.469 6.54 5.096 4.029 3.582
200 -1.088 -1.267 -1.356 -1.176 4.451 3.223 2.554 2.094
300 -0.7677 -0.8723 -0.8377 -0.8485 3.592 2.663 1.949 1.685
CCEMG estimator
50 -6.268 -6.303 -6.2 -6.24 10.68 8.915 7.572 7.232
100 -3.381 -3.574 -3.594 -3.515 7.047 5.732 4.77 4.367
200 -1.975 -2.096 -2.229 -2.034 4.813 3.652 3.115 2.682
300 -1.55 -1.643 -1.594 -1.618 3.955 3.071 2.393 2.204
Naive estimator
50 36.45 36.53 36.5 36.91 38.17 37.86 37.56 37.9
100 40.32 39.82 40.22 39.99 41.16 40.46 40.69 40.48
200 42.07 41.96 41.72 42 42.47 42.25 41.96 42.22
300 42.32 42.34 42.47 42.46 42.59 42.54 42.63 42.61
Linear probability estimator
50 4.269 4.249 4.381 4.296 10.02 7.887 6.366 5.808
100 2.259 2.009 1.987 2.088 6.83 5.049 3.796 3.399
200 0.9125 0.7905 0.649 0.8506 4.57 3.164 2.33 1.986
300 0.4143 0.2925 0.3499 0.3362 3.726 2.657 1.858 1.56
Notes: The mean group estimator of the average marginal effect is reported. The data generating
process is defined in (17)-(21) (in the main paper) except that kji2 ∼ NID(0, 0.1). The number of
replications is set to 2000.
15
Table 9: The effect of yields on bond issuance for US firms: controlling for liquidity
Pre-crisis Post-crisis
All Financial Other All Financial Other
Coefficient estimates
Yield -0.127 -0.062 -0.184 -0.05 -0.06 -0.09
(-1.727) (-0.394) (-2.116) (-1.327) (-1.046) (-1.887)
Size -0.073 -0.049 -0.09 -0.077 -0.051 -0.068
(-0.403) (-1.475) (-0.35) (-0.512) (-1.206) (-0.324)
Liquidity 2.474 2.398 2.604 15.561 -3.419 21.484
(4.57) (2.257) (3.712) (1.062) (-0.724) (1.072)
Marginal effects
Yield -0.016 -0.001 -0.022 -0.009 -0.004 -0.015
Size -0.004 -0.01 -0.002 -0.011 -0.009 -0.01
Liquidity 0.39 0.456 0.389 4.79 -0.82 6.627
Observations 321 62 225 375 72 270
Notes: The dependent variable is 1 if a firm issues a bond in a particular month and zero otherwise.
Yield is the firm-specific corporate bond yield, size is measured by assets/1000 and liquidity is the
share of current debt among total debt. All specifications include a measure of credit supply (leverage
in the broker-dealer market), the federal funds rate (pre-crisis only) and the change in Federal Reserve
Holdings of Treasury Notes (post-crisis only) as common factors. Columns (1) and (4) use all firms,
(2) and (5) use financial sector firms and (3) and (6) use all other firms (excluding mining and
agriculture). t-statistics are shown in parenthesis.
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Table 10: The effect of yields on bond issuance for US firms: corporate spreads instead of yields
Pre-crisis Post-crisis
All Financial Other All Financial Other
Coefficient estimates
Spread -0.115 -0.261 -0.137 -0.044 -0.013 -0.098
(-1.452) (-1.334) (-1.56) (-1.049) (-0.224) (-1.845)
Size 0.085 -0.011 0.13 -0.23 -0.027 -0.29
(0.337) (-0.38) (0.363) (-3.18) (-0.473) (-2.965)
Marginal effects
Spread -0.016 -0.029 -0.018 -0.008 0.002 -0.016
Size 0.02 -0.004 0.032 -0.027 -0.006 -0.034
Observations 321 62 225 378 72 273
Notes: The dependent variable is 1 if a firm issues a bond in a particular month and zero otherwise.
Spread is the firm-specific corporate bond yield minus the federal funds rate and size is measured
by assets/1000. All specifications include a measure of credit supply (leverage in the broker-dealer
market) and the change in Federal Reserve Holdings of Treasury Notes (post-crisis only) as common
factors. Columns (1) and (4) use all firms, (2) and (5) use financial sector firms and (3) and (6) use
all other firms (excluding mining and agriculture). t-statistics are shown in parenthesis.
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Table 11: The effect of yields on bond issuance for US firms: alternative sample choices
a) Firms with at least 20 time series observations
Pre-crisis Post-crisis
All Financial Other All Financial Other
Coefficient estimates
Yield -0.166 -0.118 -0.216 -0.057 -0.025 -0.109
(-1.972) (-0.691) (-2.114) (-1.382) (-0.405) (-2.099)
Size 0.043 0.063 0.031 -0.22 -0.009 -0.278
(0.199) (0.935) (0.103) (-2.921) (-0.117) (-2.755)
Marginal effects
Yield -0.02 -0.001 -0.026 -0.01 -0.002 -0.017
Size -0.028 -0.004 -0.035 -0.028 -0.004 -0.035
Observations 337 64 237 387 74 279
b) Firms with at least 40 time series observations
Pre-crisis Post-crisis
All Financial Other All Financial Other
Coefficient estimates
Yield -0.163 -0.193 -0.216 -0.034 -0.022 -0.083
(-1.995) (-1.149) (-2.245) (-0.869) (-0.349) (-1.695)
Size 0.105 0.022 0.12 -0.174 -0.014 -0.222
(0.454) (0.722) (0.368) (-2.369) (-0.274) (-2.219)
Marginal effects
Yield -0.02 -0.016 -0.026 -0.006 0.001 -0.013
Size 0.023 0 0.031 -0.02 -0.002 -0.026
Observations 301 58 212 366 70 263
Notes: The dependent variable is 1 if a firm issues a bond in a particular month and zero otherwise.
Yield is the firm-specific corporate bond yield and size is measured by assets/1000. All specifications
include a measure of credit supply (leverage in the broker-dealer market), the federal funds rate
(pre-crisis only) and the change in Federal Reserve Holdings of Treasury Notes (post-crisis only) as
common factors. Columns (1) and (4) use all firms, (2) and (5) use financial sector firms and (3)
and (6) use all other firms (excluding mining and agriculture). t-statistics are shown in parenthesis.
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Table 12: The effect of yields on bond issuance for US firms: firms with at least 2 issuances
Pre-crisis Post-crisis
All Financial Other All Financial Other
Coefficient estimates
Yield -0.137 -0.252 -0.139 -0.066 0.034 -0.152
(-1.195) (-1.175) (-0.981) (-1.291) (0.391) (-2.424)
Size 0.108 -0.025 0.137 -0.181 -0.096 -0.216
(0.392) (-0.695) (0.353) (-2.312) (-2.351) (-1.999)
Marginal effects
Yield -0.02 -0.019 -0.021 -0.011 0.009 -0.024
Size 0.021 -0.007 0.03 -0.023 -0.015 -0.027
Observations 240 48 170 250 50 180
Notes: The dependent variable is 1 if a firm issues a bond in a particular month and zero otherwise.
Yield is the firm-specific corporate bond yield and size is measured by assets/1000. All specifications
include a measure of credit supply (leverage in the broker-dealer market), the federal funds rate
(pre-crisis only) and the change in Federal Reserve Holdings of Treasury Notes (post-crisis only) as
common factors. Columns (1) and (4) use all firms, (2) and (5) use financial sector firms and (3)
and (6) use all other firms (excluding mining and agriculture). t-statistics are shown in parenthesis.
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